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Abstract.  This paper adopts a holistic approach to Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
security that considers security and privacy under resource constraints concurrently.  In this 
context, a practical realization of a secure passive (battery-less) RFID tag is presented.  The tag 
consists of an off the shelf front end combined with a bespoke 0.18µm Application Specific 
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) assembled as a credit card sized prototype.  The ASIC integrates the 
DXWKRUV¶XOWUDORZSRZHUQRYHO$GYDQFHG(QFU\SWLRQ6WDQGDUG$(6GHVLJQWRJHWKHUZLWKDQRYHO
random number generator and a novel protocol which provides both security and privacy.  The 
analysis presented shows a security of 64-bits against many attack methods.  Both modelled and 
measured power results are presented.  The measured average core power consumed during 
continuous normal operation is 1.36µW. 
Keywords: RFID, challenge-response, security, privacy, low power, AES, RNG  
1 Introduction 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems usage has seen a dramatic surge 
in recent years.  Such systems, as illustrated typically in Fig. 1, have three 
principal components, a radio tag or transponder, a reader and a database [1].  The 
tags comprise small integrated circuits typically connected to a small wire coil 
antenna and attached to an item or carried by a person to facilitate electronic 
identification.  This can be in terms of an electronic product code (EPC) [2] or a 
unique serial number.  The reader emits a radio signal which provides the 
challenge to tag and in the case of passive tags also provides the source of energy 
for the tags operation.  The RFID process is non-contact, does not require line of 
sight and depending on the selected RF band and antenna design can be carried 
out at ranges from several millimetres to several meters.  Typically a database is 
then TXHULHGXVLQJWKHWDJ¶VLGHQWLILHUWRSURYLGHIXUWKHUGHWDLOV 
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Fig. 1.  Typical RFID System 
RFID technology already pervades our daily lives from management of the supply 
chain (attached to goods in retail stores, car tires, etc) through to the chip in you 
car key which operates the immobilizer [3].  RFID already offers very many 
benefits to society however there have been a number of privacy and security 
concerns raised regarding the proliferation and standardization of RFID together 
with real world examples of exploitation of the negative aspects [4-8]. 
The privacy concern arises from the ability to remotely interrogate an 
RFID at a distance to ascertain some information about the individual or 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VSURSHUW\>@ 2QHSDUWLFXODUFRQFHUQ LV WKHDssociation of particular 
tag response(s) with a specific individual disclosing their location, often referred 
to as location privacy [10]. 
Security issues for RFID centre around the ability to forge the credentials 
embodied by the device.  This may be in terms of cloning the RFID or mimicking 
LW¶VUHVSRQVHVWRDUHDGHU 
The majority of the population of tags form part of the supply chain and 
are removed or disabled (killed) at a point of sale [11].  It has been argued [12] 
that if the disposition of tags is tracked by so called smart shelves during shopping 
then the individuals shopping habits can be ascertained.  However, there is a 
second class of RFID, where as part of its normal lifecycle remains active whilst 
in the possession of an individual, thus posing far greater privacy and security 
concerns.  Examples include: identity cards, car keys, car tyres, medicine 
packaging and some higher value retail products. 
Economics plays a large role in the design of RFID tags: they must be 
fundamentally low cost as they are frequently attached to low value items.  The 
deployers of RFID are normally interested in issues such as product 
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authentication, counterfeit detection and supply chain efficiency.  It has been 
stated that to be economic any tag-borne security measures must fit within an area 
of 250-3000 gate equivalents [8,10,11].  It is expected that the economic limit of 
area will increase year-on-\HDULQOLQHZLWK0RRUH¶VODZ 
Research in RFID technology, and in particular RFID security, is currently 
very active and is summarized in two recent review papers [8,13].  The challenge 
is to develop secure protocols for RFID which do not leak sufficient information 
(i.e. an identifier) which in turn may be used to derive personal information about 
its owner / bearer.  Previous attempts have focused exclusively on privacy at the 
expense of security, and vice-versa.  Even the best previous attempts at such 
protocols [10,14-18] have vulnerability to either Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, 
radio-relay attack [19] or allow user tracking via a unique constellation of non-
unique identifiers [10]. 
Modelled results for the baseband part of a UHF RFID tag using the AES 
were reported in [20]. However, the design is rather large (approx. 3 times larger 
than this work) with only simulated power results and with unknown duty cycle.  
Further, a Tausworthe PRNG [21] is used which may initialize to a known state 
facilitating a number of attacks.  The on-tag storage of a long-term secret-key 
shared between a large set of tags and readers makes a tempting target for reverse 
engineering or side channel analysis of a tag. 
Typically passive tags are powered by rectifying the applied RF field and 
use this same field as the clock source.  This constrains the design to operate on 
very tight energy / power budgets and effectively fixes the clock rate.  The limited 
power also limits the available area in terms of static power consumption together 
with economic factors.  This has a disadvantage for cryptographic protocols, in 
that the tag is not powered between interrogations thus cannot have its own sense 
of time. 
The challenge-response model, adopted in the majority of RFID systems,  
requires two-way communication; however, a passive  tag derives its clock from 
WKHUHDGHU¶VWUDQVPLVVLRQWKXVFDQQRWdiscern time/phase changes, hence the only 
suitable modulation for reader-to-tag communication is basic on-off keying.  
Conversely the tag-to-reader channel may select a more efficient modulation. 
There are a number of protocols which have been proposed which require 
the tag to update its NVRAM; such write operations are typically expensive in 
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terms of power and time and also raise data integrity issues (due to loss of power) 
which must be addressed by additional complexity.  Further, if there is a 
requirement to write to the NVRAM this opens up a set of DoS attacks with a 
high degree of permanence. 
If a tag can keep a static identifier internally, then One Time 
Programmable (OTP) memory may be used which represents considerable 
savings over NVRAM.  However, to maintain security or privacy such an 
identifier cannot be transmitted in the clear. 
Tags typically operate in a fundamentally insecure environment in which 
an attacker may seek to counterfeit them (in order to copy the item they protect).  
It is assumed that they may be subject to side channel analysis and reverse 
engineering.  This places a limit on the value and longevity of any key which such 
a tag attempts to store securely. 
In this paper, a holistic approach that considers security and privacy 
concurrently under constraints of low resource and real-time operation, is adopted 
for addressing the current security limitations in RFID systems and in particular 
passive RFIDs; work is presented that shows the practicality of integrating a 
strong cryptographic primitive into a battery-less (sometimes referred to as 
passive) RFID together with a secure protocol and supporting random number 
generator (RNG) to produce a working prototype tag without the need for writing 
to non-volatile memory during its normal operation.  This is believed to be the 
first reported integrated implementation for such a design.  A number of 
innovations, in terms of very low power, very low number of cycles and very low 
area for the strong cryptographic primitives, were made to achieve the required 
performance within the stringent constraints imposed by low frequency passive 
RFIDs.  The results from a manufactured prototype, including a dedicated 0.18Pm 
CMOS chip, are presented to demonstrate functionality and performance. 
2 Holistic Approach 
The fundamental concepts are in fact concerned with the generic problem of 
anonymous transfer and/or verification of identity in a real time 
(wireless/network) environment which in practice, if advances are to be made, 
necessitates the investigation of security versus privacy versus real time operation 
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versus resources in a holistic manner; existing approaches tended to focus on 
single aspects of this cost function at a time. 
A holistic approach, as proposed in Fig. 2, investigates security and 
privacy concurrently at all levels (protocol, primitives, and physical) under a 
range of practical constraints dictated by intended usage. 
 
Security V Privacy V usage
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Hash
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Fig. 2.  Holistic approach 
 
From Fig. 2 two key technical challenges may be identified in the context of 
RFID: 
The first challenge is the development of practical secure protocols 
between the tag and reader which do not leak private information; indeed even the 
best previous attempts, as indicated in the introduction, have vulnerabilities so a 
revised protocol is needed. 
The second challenge is the design of very low area and very low power 
high-strength cryptographic primitives for the tag since RFIDs impose stringent 
restrictions on resources in terms of area, power and number of cycles consumed.  
This in turn imposes serious limitations on the attainable security strength.  Strong 
ciphers usually require significant resources for their implementations.  To enable 
strong security to be incorporated in RFIDs it is therefore necessary to challenge 
the low resource/power design space for existing strong ciphers.  This necessitates 
devising very low resource/power implementations commensurate with the very 
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tight area, power and timing constraints for the most challenging (RFID) 
applications.  Previous attempts have failed to do so.  For example at the lowest 
frequencies, approx. 100kHz, RFIDs, a crypto-engine would need to operate using 
single digit microwatts and provide a response to the challenge in a few 
milliseconds. 
3 Protocols 
For an authentication system, the objective is to prove knowledge of an identifier 
without compromising the identifier to any potential attacker.  In such a system, 
security would be considered breached if the identifier can be copied whereas the 
privacy would be considered weak if any predictable bit sequence (which could 
then be associated with an individual) can be gained by an attacker. 
3.1 Types of protocol 
The existing protocols for battery-less RFID systems fit into a number of 
categories that have already been reviewed in detail in [8,13] and briefly 
summarized below: 
static ID: When energized, the tag responds by returning a string of bits 
composing a fixed identifier, for example an electronic product code.  Such 
schemes are common in the retail sector and use write-enable unlocking 
passwords and are typically removed or disabled at the point-of-sale. 
refreshed ID: As with static ID, the tag repeatedly broadcasts its identifier 
when energized, however, on successful reading by a legitimate reader a new 
identifier is generated by the reader and sent to the tag typically with a write-
enable unlocking password. 
hashed ID: The tag performs a hashing operation, H(ID), on its own 
identifier, storing the new result and transmits part of the result to the reader as its 
temporary identifier.  All tags in this category must perform an NVRAM write 
operation to store H(ID). 
keyed authentication: The tag performs a key dependant cryptographic 
hash operation with its identifier with a once-only random number, a nonce, (N) to 
yield an authentication code (MAC) which is transmitted to the reader.  There are 
a number of variations in this category depending on the source of N; these are tag 
generates Nt, reader transmits Nr to tag or both. 
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Table 1 summarises the communication and tag operation overhead (all are 
assumed to include transmission, reception and non-volatile memory storage) for 
the various schemes. 
 
Table 1.  Types of tag and their operations 
Type Reader to tag On-tag operations Tag to reader 
static none - ID 
refreshed newID+passwd NVwrite ID / newID 
hashed none H(ID), NVwrite part H(ID) 
auth (Reader) Nr H(ID,Nr) H(ID,Nr) 
auth (Tag) none gen(Nt), H(ID,Nt) Nt,H(ID,Nt) 
auth (Mutual) Nr gen(Nt), H(ID,Nr,Nt) Nt,H(ID,Nr,Nt) 
 
In terms of accessing the security or privacy of an RFID system a number 
of assumptions are made in terms of the avenues of attack and their goals whilst 
meeting some operational requirements for the system. 
The assumed requirement for this system is to provide entity 
authentication.  In a real system there may be many readers per operator and 
multiple operators.  A protocol which supports the use of a single tag by different 
operators would be advantageous.  The bearer of the tag seeks to prove its identity 
to the operator by presenting an 5),' WDJ WR WKH RSHUDWRU¶V UHDGHU  $ VHFRQG
requirement is that the owner wishes their identifying information to remain 
confidential from an attacker.  In this context the identifying information is taken 
to be any predictable bit sequence.  It is assumed that, beyond the identifier, all 
further information is stored in a central database (or set of databases) with the 
possibility of later off-line lookup; the latter enables the use of non-networked 
hand-held readers. 
 
3.2 Methods of attack 
This section provides a brief overview of possible attack methods that can be 
mounted on RFID systems, each may seek to challenge privacy or security 
aspects: 
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eavesdropping: The attacker (Eve) passively monitors the 
communications between tag/reader. 
man-in-the-middle: In a traditional communications system the attacker 
(Mallory) places himself between the communicating parties.  This is not practical 
for very short range RFID systems.  However, the attacker may use a radio relay, 
see below. 
radio relay: The attacker shares a covert radio link with an accomplice.  
The accomplice relays information from an authentic tag remote from the reader 
to the attacker who is close to the reader, thus the attacker gains the advantage of 
virtual presence of the tag.  The attacker may also modify these communications.  
The simple radio-relay attack cannot be prevented by purely cryptographic means; 
countermeasure to this attack is based on limiting the acceptable propagation time 
between challenge and response.  It is common risk to all contactless systems.  
Limiting the distance over which such a relay can be effective is the subject of 
distance bounding protocols, relying on the timing accuracy to which a 
transponder response to a random challenge can be measured [22,23].  In practice 
low bandwidths and noisy multi-path signal environments make this somewhat 
more difficult. 
denial of service: All radio links are vulnerable to local jamming, 
however in the context of RFID of concern is the permanent DoS attack where the 
DWWDFNHUV¶ DFWLRns effectively disable a tag or reader to prevent future 
authentications taking place. 
counterfeit tag: The attacker attempts to generate (valid) responses for a 
tag using a fake tag.  A legitimate tag may have been previously observed. 
malicious reader: The attacker attempts to generate challenges to pretend 
to be a legitimate reader and to communicate with legitimate tags to gain some 
advantage. 
reverse engineering: The reader is assumed to contain a tamper resistant 
trusted computing module which is beyond practical attack (contains battery, 
sensors and wipes stored information making it useless on detecting a physical 
attack).  It is assumed that the costs of reverse engineering a tag will be beyond 
the economic advantage gained from doing so. 
side channel analysis: The attacker attempts to monitor EM fluctuations 
from the tag or inject faults in order recover key information from the tag.  
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Adopting a low frequency and good clock/power management circuitry together 
with running a TRNG during cryptographic operations makes mounting such 
attacks considerably harder.  However, this risk is somewhat unquantifiable in 
practice. 
reader networks: The links between readers and databases are considered 
beyond attack from the perspective on an RFID protocol and would be protected 
by more traditional network security schemes (eg TLS). 
 
3.3 Analysis using games 
A protocol may be analyzed as a set of games played out by the legitimate 
participants and would-be attackers of the system.  The holder of the tag may be 
considered to be the prover and the reader system the verifier. 
authentication game: The verifier seeks a message from the prover to 
show they know some secret (the identifier).  Typically in order to avoid replay 
attacks this involves a unique challenge issued by the verifier.  This game tests 
half of the security model for a system. 
counterfeit game: $QDWWDFNHUPD\WU\WRFRS\DWDJRUWKHWDJ¶VUHVSRQVHV
ZLWK WKH DLP RI HLWKHU FRPSURPLVLQJ WKH WDJ¶V LGHQWLILHU RU VHHN WR GXSOLFDWH
responses from an authentic tag.  This game tests the second half of the security 
model for a system. 
anonymity game: An attacker seeks a static or predictable identifier with 
the aim of tracking the tag or its carrier.  The attacker may eavesdrop, modify or 
replicate communications between tag/reader or create their own malicious reader 
to mount such an attack.  There is a totalitarian variation of this game where the 
attacker is a legitimate reader of tags and seeks to track all tags.  However, for say 
N tags, generating a much shorter watch-list of say N tags is considered an 
acceptable compromise for a totalitarian model.  This game tests the privacy mode 
for a system. 
 
There are very many different scenarios and methods of attack which can 
be played out.  A brief summary is given in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Tag ID protection 
Type Authentication denial Counterfeit Anonymity 
static 8 large no of duplicated fake 
IDs cannot determine real one 
8 ID in clear can 
directly copy 
8 ID is in clear 
refreshed 8 mandates a single authority 
/ database for refreshing ID, 
loss of data link 
~ ID in clear but of 
limited lifetime 
8 reader can use 
predictable sequence 
IRU³QHZ,'´ 
hashed 8 desynchronization / loss of 
chain-of-IDs possible and 
irrecoverable 
9 strong 8 future values of ID 
can be pre-computed 
auth(Reader) 9 strong 9 strong 8 reader can use 
standardized 
challenge 
auth(Tag) 8 really needs single database 
to mitigate replay attacks 
ideally store all responses ± 
impractical! 
8 tag can use small set 
of Nt with known auth 
codes 
9 strong 
auth(Mutual) 9 strong 9 strong 9 strong 
3.4 Double-Challenge-Response Protocol 
The novel authentication protocol developed here falls into the auth(Mutual) 
category, which is the only category with the possibility of strong resistance to the 
three games.  Random numbers are generated by both reader and tag and a keyed 
hash operation used to produce the authentication code.  This novel protocol is 
based on [24] with a repeated challenge being used to avoid the inevitable 
authentication code collisions (birthday paradox) and provide security of at 
minimum O(264) and ideally O(280).  Allowing for the possibility of a time-
memory trade-off, a key length of 128-bits will be used.  The actual complexity of 
an attack will depend on the number of tags within the much larger key space.  An 
assumption that there are less than 264 tags within the 2128 key space is made. 
It should be noted that the XOR operation is not suitable for combining the 
reader and tag nonces, Nr and Nt (the tag has not committed to Nt thus could 
attempt to cheat the reader), thus concatenation was used instead. 
Such a protocol avoids the tag having to perform any NVwrite operations 
however does require transmission of Nr by the reader.  The inclusion of Nr (a 
random number the reader is content with) prevents the trivial replay attack. 
The protocol starts by the reader issuing a challenge to which a tag must 
respond.  In this protocol the challenge consists of a random value, Nt (of an 
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unpredictable nature which the reader is satisfied with).  The tag takes this value, 
generates a random value of its own, Nt (a value that the tag is satisfied is 
unpredictable).  These values are combined in the tag with a secret identifier, ID, 
using a strong cryptographic operation, H.  The output from H is truncated to the 
required length and broadcast by the tag, as the authentication code X, together 
with the random value the tag generated, Nt7KHUHDGHUFDQWKHQXVHWKHWDJ¶V
response to query a database containing known tag identifiers (and repeating the 
cryptographic operation, H, for each) to determine which identifier the tag knows.  
To achieve the required security level whilst maintaining short messages, this 
process requires repeating a second time with a different random value of Nr to 
finally prove the authenticity of the tag. 
 
The protocol is summarised by the following algorithm: 
reader: Nr m random number 
transmit Nr 
tag: Nr m received value 
Nt m random number 
X m H(ID,Nr|Nt) 
transmit Nt and (part) X 
reader: Nt1,pX1 m received value 
for {all IDs in database} 
 X' m H(IDi,Nr|Nt1) 
 if  (part) X' =  pX1 
  Nr2 m random number 
  transmit Nr2 
  Nt2,pX2 m received value 
  Y' m H(IDi,Nr2|Nt2) 
  if  (part) Y' = pX2  and pX1  z pX2 
   tag is IDi 
  end if 
 end if 
end for 
 
The protocol ensures privacy by preventing any active or passive attacker 
from gaining any information which is distinguishable from a random sequence.  
First consider the cryptographic operation, this converts a plaintext to ciphertext 
using a key such that any set of ciphertext without knowledge of the key cannot be 
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used to recover plaintext or the key (at a lower complexity than brute force trying 
all keys).  By definition, successive outputs from a strong cipher will be 
indistinguishable from a random bit stream (else it would have a distinguishing 
attack).  In terms of privacy, given a guaranteed source of random plaintext for the 
challenge and the key remaining secret, then the generated response will be 
indistinguishable from a random sequence.  In this protocol all the challenges and 
responses in normal operation are indistinguishable from a random sequence.  If a 
malicious reader was to issue a standard challenge, Nr ensures that the tags 
response remains indistinguishable. 
An alternative visual representation of this protocol is given in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3.  Double challenge response protocol 
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As the internal identifier of the tag remains unchanged there is easy 
support for multiple reader databases and privacy is protected by the dependence 
of the authentication message on the unpredictable Nt (a random number the tag is 
content with).  This forces the reader / database to perform comparison with all 
known tags for a match (computationally expensive) and thus limits the size of 
databases.  For databases, say at the national level, this may be mitigated by the 
user of the tag supplying some (any) additional information of the users choosing 
to reduce the search space (eg a pin number or date of birth). 
4 The Cryptography Primitives 
The starting place for selection of a suitable keyed hash or block cipher primitive 
is to determine the required strength.  A brute-force attack strength of 264 is 
selected as a suitable design strength.  Thus, Nt and Nr must both be 64-bits.  
Concatenation gives a 128-bit block size.  To avoid collisions, order 2N, a key 
length of 2N is needed, i.e. 128 bits.  To prevent lookup table creation of low 
order (<264), the authentication code needs to be 64-bits and then only part (i.e. 
half) the response.  Thus a low resource, accepted as cryptographically strong, 
primitive with 128-bit block size and 128-bit key is sought. 
The obvious choices are SHA-1 [25] and the AES [26], recent work 
[27,28] has shown the AES is lower resource than SHA- 7KHDXWKRUV¶ UHODWHG
work [29] offers even more superior low-resource (power-area-time) performance 
thus used as the cipher primitive for the tag. 
4.1 Analysis against attack games 
Both notions of security and privacy can be analysed by estimating the 
amount of work that needs to be done by an attacker to gain an advantage.  Using 
O(2N) to indicate a non-polynomial level of effort against the previously described 
attack games. 
he security analysis for a system using the proposed protocol is as follows: 
a legitimate verifier knows a list of possible IDs and is seeking to verify that the 
tag has one of these.  Two challenge-response cycles provides authentication to 
the required security level against counterfeit responses to challenges.  The 
attacker has no control over Nr but still has a number of attack options all at least 
O(280): 
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(a) an attacker could attempt to store a partial table of (Nr,Nt|X) for pairs of 
responses from a valid tag; to succeed two successive correct responses are 
required.  For a table with 2m entries (each pair totalling 384 bits) giving a 
memory complexity of 2m+8.6 and a time complexity to acquire the data of 
2m+1 challenges.  The probability of a known challenge, Nr occurring has a 
time complexity of 264-m.  Thus the attacker has to wait by the reader for this 
amount of time (potentially at risk).  The preparation phase requires time-
memory complexity of 22m+9.6 and the attack has a waiting time of 264-m.  It 
should be noted that with a 10Hz challenge response cycle such an attack 
would be impractical (max 220 challenges per day).  For one-days(!) waiting 
time m=43 with a 50% probability of success thus precomputation is 295.  
(b) brute force test all IDs O(2128) 
(c) attempt key recovery attack on AES (only half of X is known)  at least O(2128) 
(d) respond with random auth code twice O(264u2). 
The tag once programmed is write protected (or could even have the key 
uniquely defined during manufacture eg laser writing) thus, permanent DoS 
attacks are not possible.  It is an essential part of the system security that the tag 
IDs be assigned from a set of uniform random numbers. 
The privacy can be tested using the anonymity game: there exists an 
adversary who does not have prior knowledge of the ID and seeks any predictable 
bit sequence (an identifier).  The best attack is to choose a fixed Nr, however the 
tag generates its own Nt thus both Nt and (part) X appear random O(264).  The 
adversary gains two random numbers and can only attempt AES key recovery as 
the best attack >O(280). 
The totalitarian sub-game on first inspection appears somewhat easier in 
that the list of tags, length M (M << 264) is known, however, the reader must do 
work O(M) to recover the ID for each tag.  Thus to recover all tags O(M2) per 
reader, say there are coincidentally M0.5 readers (a conservative assumption) then 
total work is at least O(M2.5).  So for an M of 50 million this is approx O(264). 
There remains the possibility of a radio relay in which the attacker shares a 
covert radio link with a legitimate tag thus gaining an assumption of possession at 
a distance.  If this is the only communication channel, such an attack cannot be 
countered by cryptographic means and instead is protected by using either 
A holistic approach examining RFID design for security and privacy     15 
 
screened reader enclosure or additional factor of identification (for example a PIN 
number entered on a keypad adjacent to the reader) [30]. 
4.2 Random Number Generator 
There are very many software methods for generating random numbers however 
WKHLU³JRRGQHVV´GHSHQGVRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ)RUFU\SWRJUDSKLFVHFXULW\DUDQGRP
number generator must be both unpredictable and uniform.  There are two main 
sets of tests currently used for such random number generators, Diehard [31] and 
NIST [32], used to provide an indication of confidence for uniform random key 
generation.  Arguably, such tests are far from perfect; consider a simple counter 
encrypted with an all zero key passed through a strong cipher such as the AES, it 
would pass all the tests however, the future sequence would be wholly 
deterministic rather than random, an attacker knowing this counter-obscuration 
was being employed could simply decrypt the current state (using the all zero key) 
to recover the counter and predict any future state. 
RNGs are defined as pseudo random number generators (PRNG) or true 
random number generators (TRNG).  To be of use for cryptography deterministic 
PRNGs must have an internal state which is undeterminable by an attacker. 
To meet our design requirements for battery-less RFID the generator 
cannot store its current state in the NVRAM, the generator must reach the random 
state within 10's of milliseconds and use very little power.  Many generators can 
take some considerable time to accumulate sufficient entropy to reach a random 
state. 
Hardware random number generators, rely on random processes in the 
physical world, such as thermal noise and chaos.  Unfortunately, many such 
processes generate non-uniform statistics, examples include Gaussian noise and 
I ³QRLVH´ IURP WKH TXDQWXP QDWXUH RI WKH HOHFWURQ  )UHTXHQWO\ D corrector 
circuit (PRNG) to compensate for non-uniform behaviour of the physical world is 
necessary. 
Table 3 presents a summary of existing methods used for hardware 
random number generators, together with the most applicable reference for low-
frequency battery-less RFID.  None were found to be suitable for this application. 
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Table 3.  Hardware RNG approaches 
Approach Process, power, area, time 
Amplified noise 2µm CMOS, 1.5mm2 3.5mW@100kHz [33] 
Bank of independent 
oscillators 
For cryptographic purposes, ~100 oscillators required [34,35]; 
would consume orders of magnitude too much power and area. 
Metastability 0.35µm, 0.031mm2, 2.92µW for 500 bps, 200 seconds to become 
random, accurate biasing needed [36] 
non-OLQHDUDQDORJµFKDRWLF¶
mapping based 
0.18µm 3.024mW(estimated): too much power.  Neither area or 
time to reach random state given in [37] 
clock jitter of HF-LF 
oscillator pair 
0.18µm 2.3mW, 0.0016mm2, 10Mbps [38], still significant power 
For this application, a random bit is required approx. every 500µs (2kbps).  
The available clock is 125kHz, attempting to generate a very low frequency 
oscillator at 2kHz would require relatively large components and not be viable.  
The alternative is to generate an oscillator >>125kHz however if running 
continuously would consume much power.  A second engineering issue arises 
from the weak power supply which may provide a convenient mechanism for the 
slow and fast oscillators to lock together. 
This problem is overcome using free running fast oscillators which are 
enabled only during the transitional periods of the low frequency clock. 
The aims for the generator are provide near uniform and unpredictable 
random Nt soon after power up and continue to do so to prevent an attacker from 
obtaining a fixed (but encrypted) identifier thus defeating the anonymity game.  
Conversely the security relies on the generator within the reader which is not so 
resource critical.  This is a somewhat weaker requirement than an influence-free, 
truly-uniform distribution mandated for random key generation. 
 
Fig. 4.  Circuit diagram of random generator 
ENABLE
RND
x8
nRST
FIELD_CLOCK
DELAYED_CLK
LT
C
D
Q
QB
LT
C
D
Q
QB
LT
D
C
Q
LT
D
C
Q
CLEAN_CLOCK
LFSR
COUNTER
 
A holistic approach examining RFID design for security and privacy     17 
 
Two gated high speed oscillators are used, with a free running frequency 
of ~2GHz.  The gating functions being defined such that one oscillator 
conditionally runs during the rising edge of the (relatively slow unstable) clock 
and the second the falling edge.  Both operate approximately 1/8 cycles with the 
possibility of both operating during the same cycle.  Both oscillators never run at 
the same instant in time.  Further, closely-placed latches are used to minimize 
power consumption and prevent meta-stability which may otherwise incur an 
additional power penalty.  These outputs are then combined with a feedback 
polynomial in a linear feedback shift register.  To prevent adverse statistics from 
the all-zero state a counter is used to restart the generator uniformly. 
Testing a hardware random number generator needs to be made under 
normal operating conditions so at only a few transactions per second presents a 
practical problem in collecting the approx 11Mbytes of data required by the test 
suites.  For this system it takes approx 3 days to acquire sufficient data to assess 
the continuously powered operation.  However for the more usual tag powering 
down between each series of a small number of challenges takes considerable 
longer, approx 3 weeks allowing sufficient powered-off period to avoid memory 
remanence. 
To date the RNG in Fig. 4 passes 14/15 of the DIEHARD tests, failing part 
of the count-the-ones test.  Further refinement of the generator and testing is still a 
work in progress.  One option, we have already tested, which passed all the tests 
was to feed the (not quite uniform) random bits into the AES key and plaintext 
inputs and perform the encryption operation.  As the AES hardware is already 
present this does not increase the area and only adds 2.8ms to the response time.  
In this application the AES is used to remove the slight non-uniformity in the 
51*V VWDWLVWLFV LW VKRXOG QHYHU EH XVHG WR JHQHUDWH µUDQGRP QXPEHUV¶ VWDUWLQJ
from a counter. 
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5 Prototype System 
 
Fig. 5.  Block diagram of system 
 
In order to control cost whilst demonstrating the practicality of a strong 
cryptographic protocol on a low frequency, 125kHz, battery-less RFID, an off the 
shelf front end and NVRAM integrated circuit was used [39].  This is shown in 
Fig. 5.  In a monolithic implementation the integration would remove the need for 
many of the I/O drivers and further reduce the total power consumption. 
The air interface for the module has been defined to be minimalist.  It uses 
on-off keying average bit rate RF/27 for reader to tag communication and 
Manchester modulation at RF/16 (data rate of RF/32) for the return channel.  The 
tag acts as a slave to the reader and processes four commands to completely 
define the protocol and permit tag programming. 
7KH WDJ¶V FRQILJXUDWLRQ UHJLVWHU LQ 195$0 LI ZULWH HQDEOed) may be 
updated with a CFG(m) command to clear the write-enable status, set the 
operating mode for the random number generator and anti-collision on read mode. 
A second command KEY(k) if the tag is write-enabled permits 
modification of the tag's 128-bit key in NVRAM. 
The IV(NrFRPPDQGVXSSOLHVWKHWDJZLWKWKHUHDGHU¶V-bit random and 
triggers the tag to perform its cryptographic operation (the tag has already 
generated a random, Nt): 
X = AES ( key, Nr | Nt ) 
The tag then transmits half of X as the message authentication code (MAC) 
together with Nt (total 128-bits).  This is encapsulated between synchronization 
tokens and repeated until the SILENCE command is received (or power is lost).  
At which time the tag resets refreshing its random, Nt. 
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In anti-collision mode the reply is punctuated by periods of silence of 
between 1 to 16 message periods.  Repetition of the same message to a challenge 
is helpful for environments attempting to read a number of tags within the same 
time frame.  It is also possible then to be extended to the classical singulation 
methods based on the response, X (eg tree-walking). 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Block diagram of ASIC 
 
An ASIC has been designed and fabricated on 0.18 µm CMOS to interface 
to the front end and integrates a random number generator, AES crypto primitive, 
modem, NVRAM interface, controlling protocol and clock management circuitry 
(Fig. 6). 
The use of a low frequency RF (sinusoid) as a clock combined with a 
UHODWLYHO\KLJKLPSHGDQFHSRZHUVRXUFHUHVXOWVLQDQHHGWRµFOHDQ-XS¶ the clock to 
prevent unintended clock transitions as the slow rising edge approaches the 
threshold voltage due the varying current demands of the on-tag logic.  This is 
done using a delayed version of the clock created using a simple RC delay and the 
circuit shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7.  Clock cleaning circuit 
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The protocol requires a source of random bits which may also be 
conveniently generated from the poor clock source using the random number 
generation circuit already described.  The generator is only enabled when 
required, to conserve power. 
The NVRAM has a bidirectional serial interface for read and write 
commands this is converted to a more conventional 8-bit RAM style interface by 
the interface module shown in Fig. 6.  The NVRAM is used to store a 
configuration word (read on reset into the tags configuration register) and the tags 
ID. 
The receive (Rx) module decodes the OOK data sent by the reader and 
passes it to the protocol controller for interpreting the commands.  The controller 
includes timeouts to prevent the tag from locking up due to communication errors. 
The low power 8-bit design for AES encryption is keyed using the tags ID 
and is used to hash the random number generated in the tag and the IV sent by 
reader to create the required MAC.  This design uses a single 8-bit 
implementation for SubBytes and requires 356 cycles (inclusive of key and data 
I/O) to perform AES encryption whilst maintaining very low power consumption. 
The random and auth code are loaded into a 128-bit register for 
transmission.  This simplifies extension to multi-tag environments.  The transmit 
(Tx) module encodes responses using Manchester coding and serially outputs this 
modulation to the antenna. 
The design was described using VHDL and synthesized, placed, routed 
and taped-out using Cadence tools.  As with most designs on deep-sub micron 
processes, it is routing limited.  After cell placement and routing the back-
annotated netlist was simulated using ModelSim and validated as a system using a 
behavioural model for the rest of the system and against known test vectors.  
Modelled power results were obtained using the system model to generate 
switching activity together with extracted layout parasitics.  The area results, post 
layout including clock tree, are expressed using the process independent measure 
of NAND Gate Equivalent (GE). 
6 Performance results 
Table 4 shows the modelled power consumption and Table 5 the timing results for 
a typical challenge-response cycle.  These are reinforced with actual 
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measurements later in this chapter.  For comparison, the relatively lengthy write 
times and power consumption for EEPROM makes the total time to receive and 
write a new tagID (128-bit key) 330ms.  This validates the assumption to avoid 
NVRAM writes during normal challenge-response operation. 
Table 4.  Modelled Results, bias 1.8V 125kHz clock 
Module Power, µW Area, GE 
Controller 0.50 899 
RandGen 3.36 (34%) 110 
Crypto(AES) 2.76 (28%) 4655 (56%)(2x128bit mem 2700 GE) 
TxUnit 1.06 1481(128bit tx reg  1350 GE) 
The rest 2.29 1115 
TOTAL 9.97 8260 
 
Table 5.  Timing for challenge-response cycle 
State Time, ms Notes 
key from NVram 2.8 direct to AES module 
generate random 33  (38%)  
receive IV 11.1 (min) 14.3 (typ) 17.4 (max) 2+64 bits 
crypto (AES) 2.7 356-16 cycles 
transmit auth 33.8  (39%) 4+64+64 bits 
receive silence command 0.8 2+2 bits 
TOTAL 84.2 (min) 87.4 (typ) 90.5 (max) 11 Hz 
 
The core area of the ASIC is 397 by 395µm (0.157mm2).  This is 
surrounded by the power rings, I/O driver cells and pads.  The design has 4 power 
pads, 4uInputs, 2uOutputs and 2uBidirectional pins.  The total chip size is 
<1mm2.  The layout and a micrograph of a manufactured chip packaged in 
SOIC16 are shown in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8.  CAD layout and die micrograph 0.18mm CMOS 
A credit-card size prototype has been assembled using a wound wire 
antenna and a small PCB containing the secure RFID transponder (SHRT) ASIC 
(this work), COTS transponder front end [39] and a 1.8V regulator.  This is shown 
in Fig. 9. 
 
Fig. 9.  Prototype battery-less secure tag 
A simple reader was constructed using off the shelf components based 
around a MicroChip 16F627A PIC, the dev. kit for the Atmel 2270B base-station 
chip and controlled via RS232 using a PC to test the system.  A number of 
different tests have been performed including a week continuous operation.  
Overall, the tag responded to 99.75% of challenges by the reader.  The challenge-
response cycle (including 9600 baud serial communication to the PC, database 
lookup and comparison) on average could be performed 6.28 times per second. 
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Fig. 10.  Assembled RFID reader 
The measured performance results for the prototype are tabulated in Table 
6.  The power results are for standard process options, the low power option could 
not be selected due to incompatibility with other designs in the multi-project 
wafer. 
Table 6.  Measured results 
Dimension Parameter Value 
RF centre frequency (kHz)    126.2 
Area core dimensions (µm) 
core area (mm2) 
chip dimensions (µm) 
chip area (mm2) 
397 x 395 
   0.157 
956 x 956 
   0.914 
Power (0.8Vcore) core, RNG off 
core, RNG for IV 
  1.19 µW 
  1.36 µW 
Power (1.8Vcore) core (RNG off) 
core (RNG for IV gen) 
core (RNG IV+noise) 
Demand on front end @ 2.8V 
   6.4 µW  
   9.6 µW 
 11.1 µW 
138 µW 
Time IV comms 
tag computation 
Auth comms 
Transactions (whole system) 
14.3 ms 
  2.68 ms 
33.4 ms 
  6.28 Hz 
 
It should be noted that the time can be reduced by performing the RNG 
calculation during IV reception and the I/O ring power consumption largely 
avoided by moving to the more usual single ASIC for the entire tag. 
7 Conclusion 
It is argued that to address RFID security versus privacy concerns, a holistic 
approach as adopted in this paper is necessary; such approach considers security 
and privacy implications concurrently under usage constraints, where protocol 
level and cryptography primitives level issues, are investigated together taking 
into account the severe constraints on area, power and cycle count.  The 
application of this approach in this paper has resulted in what is believed to be the 
first real demonstration of a passive (battery-less) RFID using the AES in a MAC 
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whilst maintaining a good notion of privacy.  The tag has a measured average core 
power consumption of 1.36µW when operated in its normal mode at 125kHz with 
a bias of 0.8V. 
It is shown that in order to achieve both security and privacy a tag must 
contain both an established secure strong cryptographic primitive and an 
unpredictable random source.  To support one-time-programmable (OTP) tags it 
is highly desirable to avoid needing retained state variables (i.e. avoid writing to 
NVRAM); this effectively excludes PRNGs which must maintain their internal 
state when the tag is not powered.  Thus an on-tag TRNG with relatively low 
latency and low power consumption is required. 
It is further argued that mutual authentication is not a requirement for 
security and privacy, merely a lesser requirement of trust in own random number 
generation is needed. 
It should be noted that the challenge-response cycle time is dominated by 
data transmission times together with on-tag random number generation.  
Similarly, random number generation tops the power table 34% followed by the 
AES at 28%. 
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 The paper is well written and the research has been very well conducted. Performance metrics 
are well defined and achieved as shown in the paper. 
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Reviewer #2:  
 
x The paper presents a holistic approach to address the problem of security and privacy in 
RFID system. The idea is interesting. Usually security and privacy are two different aspects of 
a system. Sometimes are conflicts. Another issue the authors considered is the resource 
constraints. I suggest to revise the paper for another round review. 
 
A paragraph on the RFID security issue added to the introduction.  Details of privacy in 
terms of identifier leakage added to section 3 together with detailed further explanation of 
how this protocol addresses the privacy issue. 
 
x The big problem of the current paper is its result. The results presented are mainly focused on 
resources, e.g., power consumption, area, and running time. But how is the basic function, 
i.e., the effectiveness in security and privacy is not described.  
For exmaple, in Section 3.2, the authors discuss many methods of attack, does the approach 
presented here address the challenges? The authors should give a theorotical analysis of their 
approach or quantitative verification. 
 
Surprising comments here given the level of detail we have covered  on the effectiveness  of 
the security and privacy of the system in the original manuscript in section 4.1 and in the 
testing of the RNG in section4.2.   
To assist the reader easily locate the details, the title of section 4.1 has been changed for extra 
clarification.  
Also, some of the basic properties inherent in a strong cipher have been added to aid 
understanding.  
The additional explanations in section 3 cover relevant explanations relating to effectiveness. 
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x Detailed explanation for the figures or tables should be added, such as Fig.1, Fig. 3, and 
algorithm in page 10. 
Figure 1 is described in the first paragraph of the introduction and is merely intended as a 
visual aid to readers less familiar with the field.   
The description of the protocol was provided diagrammatically in fig.3 and 
programmatically as an algorithm. 
As s requested the descriptive text has been extended together with its relevance to security 
and privacy. 
 
In the abstract, some abbrevations are not defined, such as RFID, ASIC, and AES. 
Definitions added. 
